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ABSTRACT  
Business-to-government (B2G) electronic auction (e-auction) markets are increasingly being used to create opportunities for 
suppliers to expand their market as well as trading activities. However, little has been done to understand the behaviour of 
suppliers participating in these markets. In this paper, we propose a framework to explain suppliers’ intention to participate, 
and the level of participation in B2G e-auction markets, which will be tested in the Thai B2G e-auction markets. Low 
supplier participation has been a major problem in the Thai e-auction markets. We posit that suppliers’ participation depends 
on organisational motivation, environmental uncertainty, and their capabilities. The conceptual framework draws from the 
Motivation-Ability Framework, Transaction Cost Theory, Institutional Theory, and Resource-Based Theory. It proposes that 
four key constructs - efficiency motive, legitimacy motive, environmental uncertainty, and organisational capabilities 
influence suppliers’ intention to participate as well as their participation level in B2G e-auction markets.  
Keywords  
Business-to-Government (B2G), electronic auction markets, suppliers’ participation, motivation-ability framework. 
INTRODUCTION 
Business-to-Government (B2G)1 electronic markets can be considered as an inter-organisational information system with 
which participating buyers and sellers utilize electronic markets for a dynamic price-making mechanism (such as electronic 
auctions), as well as for the exchange of information related to price, product specification, and terms of the trade (Bakos, 
1991; Grewal, Comer and Mehta, 2001). Electronic auction (e-auction) markets are increasingly being used in B2G electronic 
markets to procure goods and services for governments; they have been reported to yield significant price reductions and time 
saving for governments as well as to create opportunity for suppliers to penetrate new markets (Beall, Carter, Carter, Germer, 
Hendrick, Jap, Kaufmann, Maciejewski, Monczka and Petersen, 2003; Emiliani and Stec, 2002; Smeltzer and Carr, 2003). 
The majority of research on e-auction markets is focused on developed countries, primarily in North America and Europe 
(Germer, Carter and Kaufmann, 2004). There is very little empirical evidence on how B2G e-auction markets perform in the 
context of developing countries. This study aims to fill a gap in the literature arising from a lack of research by examining the 
role of various factors on intention and level of participation in the B2G e-auction markets environment. Developing 
countries generally lack resources (e.g. skilled people, proper ICT infrastructure) and they also generally report slow 
                                                          
1
 Business-to-Government is defined as “business activity that involves a business selling its products or services to the central, regional or 
local government” (source:  http://business.govt.nz). 
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economic progress (Jones, 2007), compared with developed countries. Molla and Licker (2005) also support this assertion 
and further suggested that businesses in developing countries are faced with number of challenges (such as technological, 
financial, and legal infrastructure constraints) in their adoption of e-commerce. These are example barriers to the 
development and support for B2G e-auction markets. The literature highlights the need in developing countries for 
transparency in e-government procurement (Rege, 2001). Equity is generally promoted for developing countries 
(United_Nations, 2005). B2G e-markets can result in more equity in supplier participation (MacManus, 2002) and therefore 
allow new suppliers to enter the marketplace using a competitive bidding process. For all the above reasons, this study which 
will be conducted in a developing country is particularly interesting. It will therefore increase our understanding of how B2G 
e-market will assist the Thai government in promoting the level of suppliers’ participation.  
The Thai B2G e-auction markets have a number of characteristics that make them suitable for this study. Firstly, the study of 
B2G e-auction markets has become significantly important for the procurement of goods and services in South East Asian 
countries including Thailand (Jones, 2007; Settoon and Wyld, 2003). The Thai government shows commitment in promoting 
the B2G e-auction markets by making it mandatory for all Thai government agencies to procure goods and services through 
e-auction markets, whenever the procurement value is more than 2 million Baht (US$ 60,000). Secondly, the National 
Statistical Organization (NSO) of Thailand reported that low supplier participation has been a major problem in the Thai e-
auction markets. This could result in a non-competitive electronic auction environment (NSO, 2007). Thirdly, primary 
researcher has full access to the Thai e-auction markets which makes this study possible. 
Prior studies suggest that a sufficient number of qualified suppliers participating in B2G e-auction markets can lead to a 
competitive market environment (Beall et al., 2003; Elmaghraby, 2005; Smeltzer and Carr, 2003). Thus, the number of 
qualified suppliers plays a significant role for the success of e-auction markets. However, the effort to understand the 
behaviour of suppliers participating in B2G e-auction markets has been lacking. Prior research in this area has two main foci, 
both in terms of the type of electronic marketplaces (e.g. B2B electronic marketplaces) (Son and Benbasat, 2007) as well as 
the research approach (e.g. qualitative case studies). Qualitative case studies provide a rich picture of specific phenomenon 
within the chosen context (e.g. (Emiliani and Stec, 2005; Hackney, Jones and Lösch, 2007; Soh, Markus and Goh, 2006). 
However, the results do not allow us to generalize to other settings and they also do not allow us to quantitatively validate 
relationships between key constructs.  
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways: Firstly, this study explicitly focuses on the linkage between 
B2G e-auction markets and supplier participation behaviour, which has not been done before. Secondly, this study 
conceptualizes supplier participation behaviour within the Motivation-Ability Framework, Transaction Costs Theory, 
Institutional Theory, and Resource-Based Theory, to extend our understanding of supplier behaviours in the B2G e-auction 
markets.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is taken from diverse disciplines; marketing, economics, organisation management, and information 
systems. We first introduce the electronic auction mechanism, then summarise four key theories important for this study, 
followed by a description of the Thai e-auction context, before stating the main research questions. 
Type of Electronic Auctions 
Electronic auction (e-auction) is defined as a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation 
and prices on the basis of electronically submitted bids from market participants (Beall et al., 2003). The term “auction” is 
used to represent both selling auctions (bidding to buy) and purchasing auctions (offering to sell) (Kaufmann and Carter, 
2004). The literature in e-auctions is usually discussed in terms of selling auctions, rather than purchasing auction, for 
simplification (Kaufmann and Carter, 2004). The four basic selling auction types were introduced by McAfee and McMillan 
(1987): (1) the English auction (ascending-bid auction), (2) the Dutch auction (descending-bid auction), (3) the first-price 
sealed-bid auction, and (4) the second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey) auction. In the same way, Kaufmann and Carter (2004) 
suggested that the four selling auction types have mirror images in the context of purchasing auction: (1) reverse English 
auction, (2) the reverse Dutch auction, (3) the first-price sealed-bid purchasing auction, and (4) the second-price sealed-bid 
purchasing auction. Moreover, the auction types can generally be defined as the following dimensions: the number of 
bidders, the number of bids per bidder, and the degree of visibility between bidders (Kaufmann and Carter, 2004). For this 
study, we employ only the first-price sealed-bid purchasing auction (with descending prices, multiple permitted bids and 
almost full visibility) because it has been used in the Thai e-auction. Thus, the terms “e-auction” used hereafter refer to “the 
first-price sealed-bid purchasing e-auction”, which refers to the electronic competitive bidding between suppliers that drives 
prices down, or purchasing auctions from buyers.  
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B2G Electronic Auction Markets 
This paper is confined to the context of a B2G e-auction market as it pertains to a situation with one buyer (government) and 
a group of sellers (Kaufmann and Carter, 2004). In B2G e-auction markets, a government procuring agency invites pre-
qualified suppliers who compete against each other to supply a specified good or service, thus driving down the price. 
Governments generally find the e-auction process attractive because of the tangible benefit of price reductions and the 
prospect of a reduced transaction cost (Beall et al., 2003; Hackney et al., 2007; Settoon and Wyld, 2003). Similarly, suppliers 
can obtain benefits from opportunities to bid electronically for new business, to penetrate new markets, to create new low 
costs sales channels, to lower overall transaction costs for buyers in e-auction markets (Smeltzer and Carr, 2003), and also to 
obtain benefit from auction process time reduction between bidding and winning the business (Smart and Harrison, 2003). 
Sometimes the auction results are announced at the end of the event, or a day or two later versus weeks or months under 
traditional auction processes. 
Transaction Cost Theory 
According to Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), all economic activity revolves around a transaction, which is simply some 
form of exchange of a good or service between two or more economic actors. Consequently, transactions may be divided into 
production and coordination costs (Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987). Coase (1937) proposed that the use of price 
mechanisms generates cost such as searching for prices, reaching an agreement and enforcing the commitments. As 
production costs remain constant regardless of the sale mechanism, this study will concentrate on coordination costs. If 
transaction costs are high, no or little economic activity from suppliers is likely to occur. Transaction cost concepts have been 
deployed in information systems to analyse the impact of information technology on the organisation of economic activity in 
markets and hierarchies (Malone et al., 1987). Bakos (1991) pointed out that information technology would reduce 
transaction costs, thereby enabling the emergence of more efficiently organised electronic markets. Soh et al.’s work (Soh et 
al., 2006) also support this assertion. 
Institutional Theory 
The institutional approach has been used to study organisations. Institutional environments are important for organisational 
structure and action (Son and Benbasat, 2007; Teo, Wei and Benbasat, 2003). The key idea behind institutionalization is that 
organisational action reflects a pattern of doing things that evolves over time and becomes legitimated within organisation 
and an environment (Eisenhardt, 1988). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggested three types of isomorphic pressures - 
mimetic, coercive, and normative – that cause an organisation to have the same form with their environment (e.g. competitors 
or government/buyer). Mimetic pressures may cause an organisation to imitate the actions of other structurally equivalent, 
whereas coercive and normative pressures operate through interconnected relations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Resource-Based Theory 
The resource based view (RBV) of the firm suggests that organisations compete and create value on the basis of resources 
that are unique, rare, valuable, and not easily imitable or substitutable (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991). Competencies develop 
when such resources are combined to create specific organisational ability (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). Mahoney et al. 
(1992) suggested three main research perspectives in resource-based theory: 1) a firm’s distinctive competencies and 
heterogeneous capabilities, 2) fitting the resource-based view within the organisational economics paradigm, and 3) its 
complementary view to industry organisation research. Peteraf (1993) also proposed a resource-based model of the 
theoretical conditions which underlie competitive advantage, namely resource heterogeneity, ex post limits to competition, 
imperfect resource mobility, and ex ante limits to competition. Hall (1993) suggested the sources of sustainable competitive 
advantage as being two types of capability differential; namely, capabilities based on assets and capabilities based on 
competencies. 
Thai B2G Electronic Auction Markets 
The Thai e-auction markets were introduced by the Thai government in 2002. The Thai B2G e-auction markets are highly 
decentralized. There is no central procuring authority or control agency, there is no purchasing department or the associated 
purchasing staff. Each of the Thai government agencies can procure the goods, services through e-auction markets provided 
by third-party providers of e-auctions. However, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has authority to issue and update 
regulations that stipulate procurement procedures and standardized contracts in order to enforce all government procuring 
agencies and public enterprise to deploy transaction through e-auction markets. Given the authority of the different 
government administration units in mandating the strict electronic procurement practices of the Thai government, it leaves 
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suppliers no choice but to comply with the set rules and regulations if they wish to expand their business to the government 
sectors.  
The Thai government procuring agencies in B2G e-auction markets face a major problem pertaining to too few suppliers 
participating in these markets - this could result in a non-competitive electronic auction environment (NSO, 2007). Smeltzer 
and Carr (2003) have suggested that at least four or five suppliers are needed to begin the bid process. Whereas, Elmaghraby 
(2005) argues that more bidders is not always better. These different views notwithstanding, it is important to understand 
what motivates suppliers to participate in the Thai B2G e-auction markets, in order to facilitate these markets’ success and to 
make these markets more competitive. Thus, the aims of this research are 1) to investigate the factors that influence suppliers’ 
intention to participate and the level of participation in the Thai B2G e-auction markets and 2) to examine differential effect 
of the four groups of factors in participation intention and participation level. The main research questions to be addressed 
are;  
1.  What types of precursor factors motivate suppliers’ intention to participate, and to increase their level of 
participation in B2G e-auction markets?  
 2.    Do these key factors play different roles in explaining suppliers’ intention to participate and participation level? 
FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, we describe the theoretical development of a framework for explaining the factors that influence suppliers’ 
participation in B2G e-auction markets. We propose that four main constructs: efficiency motive, legitimacy motive, 
environmental uncertainty, and supplier capabilities - influence suppliers’ participation (dependent variable) in B2G e-
auction markets. Components of the proposed model (Figure 1) are explained below.  
 
Figure 1. Research Framework for B2G e-Auction Markets 
Supplier Participation 
In B2G e-auction markets, suppliers’ participation can be classified into two groups; transaction intention and participation 
level.  
Transaction Intention 
In the technology acceptance model and e-commerce literature, transaction intention is likely to influence future transaction 
behaviour (Davis, 1989; Son and Benbasat, 2007; Teo et al., 2003). Behavioural intention refer to the motivational factors 
that reflect how people are willing to try to undertake a behaviour (Ajzen, 1991).  
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The Level of Participation 
To deal with the varying levels of supplier activities in B2G e-auction markets, the participation level can be classified into 
four distinct stages: the exploration stage, the trial stage, the commitment stage, and passive stage (Grewal et al., 2001; Son 
and Benbasat, 2007). A supplier firm can only be in one stage at any point in time (Grewal et al., 2001). In the exploration 
stage, the supplier has been registered in the B2G e-auction market but has not yet begun to conduct trading activities 
through the e-auction market. In the trial stage, the supplier will have conducted several transactions through a B2G e-
auction market, but supplier is still evaluating the pros and cons of this means of doing business. In the commitment stage, 
the supplier has made a full commitment because trading through a B2G e-auction market has become an important part of its 
operations. In the passive stage, the supplier has considered not doing business or terminated conducting business in the B2G 
e-auction market.  
Efficiency Motive 
Efficiency and effectiveness benefits encourage organisations to participate in e-commerce (Bakos, 1991). An e-market can 
reduce coordination costs, which include setting up a relationship, search costs, and market costs, between the buyers and the 
sellers (Bakos, 1991). We draw from the Transaction Cost Theory to study the economic organisation of how suppliers seek 
to minimize transaction costs (Williamson, 1981). Arguments for the move to e-markets were based on expected reduction in 
the transaction costs between buyers and sellers (Bakos, 1991; Williamson, 1981; Williamson, 1999). Malone et al. (1987) 
provide two characteristics of products (i.e. asset specificity and product description complexity) which can influence an 
organisation to select one of governance structures between electronic markets and electronic hierarchies that minimize their 
total cost.  
Product Characteristics 
Hackney et al. (2007) suggest that not all products are equally suitable for procuring through e-auction markets. Hur et al. 
(2007) also support this assertion and further suggest that not all products are auction-suitable and the commodities are most 
suitable for e-auction markets. The type of products directly impact on its specificity (Hackney et al., 2007) and product 
description complexity (Malone et al., 1987). Malone et al. (1987) proposed two characteristics of products (i.e. asset 
specificity and product description complexity) that influence suppliers to participate in a B2G electronic auction market. 
Asset specificity refers to transaction-specific capital investments (e.g., in customized machinery, tools). If products in the e-
auction market have high asset specificity, suppliers tend not to participate in this market. Product description complexity 
refers to the amount of information necessary to describe the attributes of a product (Malone et al., 1987; Son and Benbasat, 
2007). If complex products are difficult to translate into unambiguous product description, suppliers tend not to participate in 
a B2G e-auction market.  
Hypothesis 1:  Product characteristics (high asset specificity and high product description complexity) in a B2G e-auction 
market will negatively influence supplier’s intention to participate and the level of participation in the B2G e-auction market. 
Market Transaction Costs 
E-markets offer facilities to support communicating information about price and production characteristics, and conducting 
transactions between buyers and sellers (Bakos, 1991; Ivang and Sorensen, 2005). E-markets can also help to reduce 
transaction costs that occur between buyers and suppliers (Bakos, 1991). Market transaction costs is defined as the 
coordination costs involved in using an outside markets, comprising operational costs and contractual costs (Gurbaxani and 
Whang, 1991). Operational costs refer to the costs for accessing market information and process transaction such as search 
costs and communication costs. Contractual costs refer to the costs of establishing and maintaining contractual relationships 
with outside parties, including costs of writing contracts and costs of enforcing contracts. We propose that the transaction 
costs that occur in B2G e-auction markets will negatively influence suppliers’ intention to participate and the level of 
participation. 
Hypothesis 2:  High market transaction costs in a B2G e-auction market will negatively influence supplier’s intention to 
participate and the level of participation in the B2G e-auction market. 
Auction Process Cycle Time 
The use of traditional processes for government buying goods and service can consume several weeks or months (Beall et al., 
2003; MacManus, 1991). On the other hand, the use of e-auction markets can decrease auction process cycle times (Emiliani 
and Stec, 2005), which are condensed into a period of a few hours (Beall et al., 2003). Process cycle time reduction in B2G e-
auction markets can benefit suppliers in that suppliers would be better able to plan production scheduling because time is 
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reduced between bidding and winning the business (Beall et al., 2003), and suppliers also save costs in terms of a reduction in 
negotiation time (Smeltzer and Carr, 2003). We propose that the longer the auction process cycle time, the less willing 
suppliers are to participate in a B2G e-auction market.  
Hypothesis 3:  The longer auction process cycle time in a B2G e-auction market will negatively influence supplier’s intention 
to participate and the level of participation in the B2G e-auction market. 
Legitimacy Motive 
Much of the institutional literature emphasises that organisational structures and processes tend to become isomorphic with 
the accepted norms for organisations of particular types (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Isomorphism is often used as a 
mechanism for reducing uncertainty by organisations by adopting innovations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). For example, 
Son and Benbasat (2007) studied how legitimacy-oriented factors, which are mimetic pressures, coercive pressure, and 
normative pressures, influence organisational buyers’ adoption and use of B2B e-marketplaces. They found that two 
isomorphic processes; mimetic and normative pressures have significant effects on adoption intent, but not on participation 
level. While, coercive pressures did not significantly explain either adoption intent or the level of participation.  
Mimetic Pressures 
As with Teo et al. (2003), we focus on two specific types of mimetic pressure: participation among competitors and 
perceived success of participated competitors. Participation among competitors refers to the participation level of 
competitors participating in B2G e-auction market. Whereas, perceived success of participated competitors refer to 
suppliers often closely monitoring their competitor to identify successful practices and imitate their actions to achieve similar 
benefits. 
Hypothesis 4:  Mimetic pressures in a B2G e-auction market will positively influence supplier’s intention to participate and 
the level of participation in the B2G e-auction market. 
Coercive Pressures 
Coercive pressures is defined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 150) as “both formal and informal pressures exerted on 
organisations by other organisations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which 
organisation function”. These pressures may take several forms, such as force, threats, persuasion, and invitation (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). For example, the government is one of the largest customers of the supplier, and the supplier’s well being 
may very much depend on whether it is being awarded the contract from the government. Thus, the purchasing volume from 
government can dominate a supplier firm’s need to participate in B2G e-auction markets.  
Hypothesis 5:  Coercive pressures in a B2G e-auction market will positively influence supplier’s intention to participate and 
the level of participation in the B2G e-auction market. 
Normative Pressures 
Normative pressures implies that strategic processes taken by organisations are subject to the values and norms shared among 
members of their social network (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Normative pressures from participation in professional and 
trade associations may promote transactions through a B2G e-auction market. We posit that the effect of supplier participated 
in professional and trade associations on the supplier’s intention to participate and the level of participation in a B2G e-
auction market. 
Hypothesis 6:  Normative pressures in a B2G electronic auction market will positively influence supplier’s intention to 
participate and the level of participation in the B2G e-auction market. 
Environmental Uncertainty 
Organisational theories have suggested that organisations must adapt their environment to remain viable in business (Duncan, 
1972). Lee and Clark (1997) claimed that environmental uncertainty is inherent in e-markets. The literature has identified 
many different environment dimensions, three factors are viewed as particularly important (Kabadayi, Eyuboglu and 
Thomas, 2007; Karimi, Somers and Gupta, 2004; Newkirk and Lederer, 2006) and have been included in a majority of e-
commerce studies. They are dynamism, complexity, and hostility. This is also consistent with Duncan’s work (Duncan, 
1972), which identifies dynamism and complexity as major sources of environmental uncertainty. Dynamism refers to the 
rate and unpredictability of environmental change. It is especially challenging for suppliers who need to participate in B2G e-
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auction markets (Kabadayi et al., 2007). Complexity refers to the number and diversity of competitors, suppliers, buyers, and 
other environmental actors that firm decision makers need to consider in formulating their strategies (Duncan, 1972; 
Kabadayi et al., 2007). Hostility represents the availability of resources and the degree of competition (Newkirk and Lederer, 
2006) in e-auction markets. Hostility can be measured in terms of the threats to the supplier’s firm posed by labor and 
material scarcity, intense competition in price, and product differentiation (Karimi et al., 2004; Newkirk and Lederer, 2006). 
Hypothesis 7:  Environmental uncertainty in a B2G e-auction market will negatively influence supplier’s intention to 
participate and the level of participation in the B2G e-auction market.  
Supplier Capabilities 
This construct is mainly drawn from Resources-Based View Theory (RBV). In the strategic management literature, there is 
growing evidence that competitive advantage often depends on the firm’s deployment of capabilities (Barney, 1991; Day, 
1994; Wade and Hulland, 2004). Thus, firm’s capabilities enable a firm to compete more effectively in the marketplace (Day, 
1994). Suppliers with greater efficiency can develop sustainable competitive advantage by using this capability to reduce 
costs and develop a cost leadership position in their industry (Barney, 1991; Porter, 1985). Hall (1993) suggests that two 
types of supplier capabilities – capabilities based on assets and capabilities based on competencies  - could influence supplier 
to gain competitive advantage in markets. 
Capabilities Based on Assets 
We propose two sub-constructs that can influence suppliers’ decision to participate in B2G e-auction markets. Cost 
leadership and excess production capacity would be used as sources for suppliers’ competitive advantage in B2G e-auction 
markets (Elmaghraby, 2005). Cost leadership refers to supplier can gain sales by offering products and/or services at a price 
that is lower than that of competitors as well as pursuing economies of scale in production (Kabadayi et al., 2007). Excess 
production capacity infers supplier may differ in its production capacity. Excess production capability can be used to supply 
products and services as supplier’s competitive advantage (Elmaghraby, 2005). If excess product capacity exists in the supply 
base, supplier can allocate this valuable resource in an e-auction market (Jap, 2002). 
Hypothesis 8:  Capabilities based on assets of supplier will positively influence supplier’s intention to participate and the 
level of participation in the B2G e-auction market. 
Capabilities Based on Competencies 
Hall (1993) proposed two types of capabilities based on competencies which can be the sources of sustainable competitive 
advantage, namely, functional capability (i.e. top management’s e-auction self-efficacy) and cultural capability (i.e. total 
quality management). In the context of B2G e-auction markets, top management’s e-auction self-efficacy refers to the 
perceptions of the owner and/or CEO of supplier to manipulate e-auction process in the accomplishment of a task (Bandura, 
1986; Compeau and Higgins, 1995). This definition is based on the concept of self-efficacy defined by Bandura (1986, 
p.391). For example, top management can use his/her ability to manipulate e-auction system provided by third-party 
providers of e-auctions. Hulland et al. (2007) also found that the organisation which had a strong IT skill capability was 
positively influenced to commit to the online channel. Total quality management (TQM) refers to the continuous 
improvement of work processes to enhance the organisation’s ability to deliver high-quality product or services in a cost-
effective manner (Beer, 2003). Supplier’s firms that implement TQM are better positioned to gain through lowered costs and 
improved customers’ satisfaction (Beer, 2003). In addition, Powell (1995) found that TQM can produce economic value; and 
it can also be used as a potential source of sustainable competitive advantage for suppliers’ firm. Thus, we expect that TQM 
can be used as a source of competitive advantage for suppliers in B2G e-auction markets. 
Hypothesis 9:  Capabilities based on competencies of supplier will positively influence supplier’s intention to participate and 
the level of participation in the B2G e-auction market. 
Construct Measurement 
In order to operationalise the constructs, scales to measure each of the constructs in the model are developed based on review 
of previous literature and existing scales are used where applicable. Some new measures are also developed from both 
research literatures and practitioner to reflect development of instruments. There are nine main constructs for this study. Six 
of the main constructs, which are product characteristics, market transaction costs, mimetic pressures, environmental 
uncertainty, capabilities based on assets, and capabilities based on competencies, which are operationalised as formative, 
whereas auction process cycle time, coercive pressure, and normative pressure are operationalised as reflective (see Table 1). 
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Scale items used to assess asset specificity and production description complexity constructs are developed from Son and 
Benbasat (2007) and Teo et al. (2003). Operational costs and contractual costs are assessed with two-item measures adapted 
from the definitions of the constructs found in Gurbaxani and Whang (1991). Moreover, the auction process cycle time is 
operationalised based on the extant definitions of the constructs found in Beall et al. (2003) and (Emiliani, 2000). Measures 
of mimetic pressures, coercive pressures, and normative pressures constructs are synthesized from Son and Benbasat (2007) 
and Teo et al., (2003). The three type of environmental uncertainty are measured, which are dynamism, complexity, and 
hostility. Dynamism and complexity are adapted from Kabadayi et al. (2007), while hostility is adapted from Newkirk and 
Lederer (2006). Capabilities based on assets construct and capabilities based on competencies construct are operationalised 
based on the competitive advantage literature found in Hall (1993). Measures of Capabilities based on assets construct is 
assessed through cost leadership and excess production capacity of supplier. Scale items for cost leadership construct are 
based on the work of Kabadayi et al. (2007), whereas excess production capacity construct is assessed with multi-item 
developed from the definition of the construct found in Elmaghraby (2005). In addition, measures of capabilities based on 
competencies construct is assessed through top management’s e-auction self-efficacy and total quality management. Scales 
items for top management’s e-auction self-efficacy are adapted from the IT self-efficacy literature found in Compeau and 
Higgins (1995). likewise, total quality management is assessed with multi-item adapted from the description of the constructs 
found in Powell (1995).  
 
Constructs Type Sub-constructs Type Source 
Mimetic pressures F Participation among competitors R Son and Benbasat, 2007 
  Perceived success of competitors R Son and Benbasat, 2007 
Coercive pressure (Perceived 
dominance of government 
procurement) 
R   Son and Benbasat, 2007 
Normative pressures (Participation 
in professional and trade 
associations) 
R   Son and Benbasat, 2007 
Product characteristics F Asset specificity R Son and Benbasat, 2007 
  Product description complexity R Son and Benbasat, 2007 
Market transaction costs F Operational costs R Developed for this study 
  Contractual costs R Developed for this study 
Auction process cycle time R   Developed for this study 
Environmental uncertainty F Dynamism R Kabadayi, 2007 
  Complexity R Kabadayi, 2007 
  Hostility R Newkirk and Lederer, 2006 
Capabilities based on assets F Cost Leadership R Kabadayi, 2007 
  Excess production capacity R Developed for this study 
Capabilities based on 
competencies F 
Top management's e-auction self- 
efficacy R Developed for this study 
  Total quality management R Developed for this study 
Transaction intention R   Son and Benbasat, 2007 
Participation level n/a     Grewal et al., 2001; Son and Benbasat, 2007 
(Adapted from Son and Benbasat 2007) Note: F = formative; R = reflective; n/a = not applicable 
Table 1. Constructs and Measures 
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have attempted to derive a theoretical framework for explaining supplier behaviours in a B2G e-auction 
context, by drawing from multiple disciplines. The outcome is derived from extensive and rigorous literature review. It is 
anticipated that the examination of four key constructs; efficiency motive, legitimacy motive, environmental uncertainty, and 
supplier capabilities will help to identify reasons for suppliers’ decision to participate in B2G e-auction markets in Thailand. 
Overall, we believe that this paper extends the understanding of supplier behaviours in the Thai B2G e-auction markets. We 
also hope that the outcome of this study encourages new thinking and research into the B2G e-auction markets. Future steps 
include interviews with suppliers in the Thai B2G e-auction markets to help use develop survey instruments, followed by pre-
test of the instruments, the main survey, and follow-up interviews (if necessary) to explore unexplained results.  
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